Extensive-form game

Results: 193



#Item
21Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213

Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-05-01 11:34:36
22Extensive-Form Solution Concepts  Page 1 Extensive-Form Solution Concepts

Extensive-Form Solution Concepts Page 1 Extensive-Form Solution Concepts

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:19
23Repeated Games  Page 1 Repeated Games

Repeated Games Page 1 Repeated Games

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:20
24Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, and the Size Distribution of Business Firms Thomas Gall∗ This Version: September 15, 2008  Abstract

Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, and the Size Distribution of Business Firms Thomas Gall∗ This Version: September 15, 2008 Abstract

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Source URL: www.elektronegativ.de

Language: English - Date: 2013-02-21 12:52:23
25MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 33, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 1002–1022 issn 0364-765X  eissn  08  3304  1002 informs

MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 33, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 1002–1022 issn 0364-765X  eissn  08  3304  1002 informs

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-25 04:32:23
26Counterfactual Regret Minimization in Sequential Security Games Viliam Lis´y and Trevor Davis and Michael Bowling Department of Computing Science University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2E8 {lisy,trdavis1,bowlin

Counterfactual Regret Minimization in Sequential Security Games Viliam Lis´y and Trevor Davis and Michael Bowling Department of Computing Science University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2E8 {lisy,trdavis1,bowlin

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Source URL: poker.cs.ualberta.ca

Language: English - Date: 2016-05-10 14:59:33
27Whither Game Theory? Drew Fudenberg† ∗  David K. Levine‡

Whither Game Theory? Drew Fudenberg† ∗ David K. Levine‡

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-03-12 03:25:53
28SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.

SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:44
29GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ARTICLE NO. 21,  ŽGA970527

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ARTICLE NO. 21, ŽGA970527

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2002-11-18 18:20:16
30Computing an Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium in Polynomial Time Wan Huang and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom , stengel

Computing an Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium in Polynomial Time Wan Huang and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom , stengel

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2008-10-25 17:36:10